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PROVOCATION 
THE COMPARATIVE TURN: ACCIDENT,  
COINCIDENCE, OR FATE? 
Katharine G. Young∗ 
Why would a long-standing leader in the field of American consti-
tutional law turn his intellectual attention to another constitutional 
system?  And why choose South Africa?  For almost two decades, 
Frank Michelman’s contribution to the field of comparative constitu-
tional law has been much like his contribution to constitutional theory 
and constitutional law in general: soaring, generous, always in dialogue 
with others, and yet always uniquely his own.  In this Provocation, I 
examine: what accounts for the comparative turn? 
I approach this matter not as one demanding historical explanation, 
but as inviting a comment on Frank’s position in the comparative con-
stitutional orbit.  Since I am not South African, my perspective is one 
of a fellow comparativist, as well as one who was lucky enough to be 
Frank’s student.  I offer three hypotheses as to why he turned to South 
Africa: the hypotheses of accident, coincidence, and fate. 
HYPOTHESIS 1: ACCIDENT 
The first hypothesis, accident, looks to the historical forces govern-
ing South Africa’s emerging constitutionalism in the early 1990s; the 
same forces, in fact, that were expanding the field of comparative con-
stitutional law.  The end of the Cold War, itself key to the defeat of 
apartheid, freed up new ideas — and old ones — about the legal struc-
turing of a modern constitutional democracy.  The influence of the 
U.S. Constitution abroad was still at its zenith1: at the same time, U.S. 
constitutional scholars — perhaps frustrated by the evolving practice 
of America’s liberal democracy, if not its template — welcomed the 
chance to explore the paths not taken for future, foreign, constitution-
alists.  South Africans, charged with the task of bringing a post-
apartheid country peacefully to democracy, and having chosen consti-
tutionalism as the model to do so, welcomed interlocutors from abroad.  
It helped to speak English.  Frank was one of these accidental 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 * Senior Lecturer of Law, Australian National University College of Law.  S.J.D. 2009 Har-
vard Law School; BA/LL.B. (Hons) 2000 The University of Melbourne.  This “provocation” is a 
revised version of a paper that was presented at the Symposium in Honor of Professor Frank 
Michelman, hosted by Harvard Law School on February 10–11, 2012. 
 1 See, e.g., CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD 13–14 (Louis Henkin & Albert Rosenthal eds., 1990). 
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comparativists.  A few introductions here, a few conversations there, 
and his comparative work began.  Instantly enamored with the people, 
their project, and their passion for that project, he stayed. 
 For the field, this explanation invites a story of modern constitu-
tional convergence, or of circulating, migrating, transplanting, morph-
ing ideas.2  It also invites rumination on Cold War ricochet effects, as 
well as the impact of the internet, informal contacts, transnational pro-
fessional communities, global rule-of-law projects and human rights 
funds, and American resources and prestige.3  It is also the modern 
story of constitutional framers becoming constitutional drafters, and of 
constitutional drafters becoming constitutional interpreters.4  Frank, 
always careful with constitutional text, but matching fidelity with pro-
bity, was well placed to take part.  Empiricism, interviews, and fact-
checking are needed to tell this story.  But the hypothesis of accident is 
clearly not the only account of Frank’s choice of comparison and of 
the influence that that choice would have. 
HYPOTHESIS 2: COINCIDENCE 
The second hypothesis is that of coincidence.  On this account, 
Frank became involved because South Africa’s peculiar needs met 
Frank’s peculiar expertise.  To a country ravaged by racism, inequali-
ty, and poverty, now committed to ending these harms by both consti-
tutional and democratic means, Frank presented several approaches of 
profound subtlety. 
Most obvious is his original work on economic and social rights (or, 
as termed in America, social welfare rights — this discrepancy in ter-
minology revealing many of the contestations and category-disputes 
that inevitably accompany rights to food, health care, housing, and ed-
ucation, as well as social security and decent work).  In 1969, Frank 
penned his famous justification for protecting the poor through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.5  Reading the existing equal protection juris-
prudence outside of an equality paradigm, he suggested that an injunc-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 2 For an example of the attempt to conceptualize this movement, see, for example, Sujit 
Choudhry, Migration as a New Metaphor in Comparative Constitutional Law, in THE 
MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 1, 16 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006).  See also ALAN 
WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS (1974). 
 3 For related depictions, see, for example, YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE 
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS (2002); RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS 
JURISTOCRACY (2004); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004). 
 4 E.g., Arthur Chaskalson, Reshaping the Structures of Justice for a Democratic South Africa, 
in RESHAPING THE STRUCTURES OF JUSTICE FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA 13 
(Michelle Norton ed., 1994). 
 5 Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term — Foreword: On Protecting the Poor 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969). 
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tion not to deny “equal protection of the laws”6 could reasonably lead 
to an affirmative requirement that the state must act to provide it,  
and that that protection amounts to what is necessary to avoid severe 
deprivation. 
Prophetically, he saw that economic and social rights would need 
both criteria for determinacy and a justiciable standard — which he 
saw as complex, but not impossible, endeavors.  Writing for an Ameri-
can audience, he did not rely on the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights of 1948, nor on the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, opened recently for signature in 1966.7  Nor did 
he note the homegrown calls for a “freedom from want” heard in 
America since the 1940s.8  He used, simply, arguments about justice — 
careful, reflective, and painstakingly made.9  And he trained his eye 
(and hope) on a Supreme Court “commendably busy with the critically 
important task of charting some islands of haven from economic disas-
ter in the ocean of (what continues to be known as) free enterprise.”10 
Of course, that busyness ended abruptly with a newly constituted 
Court, established after Richard Nixon’s narrow win in the 1968 elec-
tion, an election fought on other grounds.11  Frank’s proposal for eco-
nomic and social rights would have to wait for a different court, a 
quarter of a century later: the South African Constitutional Court. 
And what of South Africa in 1969?  South Africa’s apartheid re-
gime was ever hardening.  In that year, the Bureau of State Security 
(BOSS) was formed.  Nelson Mandela had spent seven of his twenty-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 6 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 7 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) 
(Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 
993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 1976). 
 8 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to the Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 11, 1944), in 
13 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 32, 34 (Samuel I. 
Rosenman ed., 1950); see also Katharine G. Young, Freedom, Want and Economic and Social 
Rights: Frame and Law, 24 MD. J. INT’L L. 182 (2009).  For current endorsements of freedom 
from want, see President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the Acceptance of the No-
bel Peace Prize, Oslo, December 10, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press 
-office/remarks-president-acceptance-nobel-peace-prize, noting that freedom from want and free-
dom from fear ground the links between civil and political rights and economic security and op-
portunity; and Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and 
Labor, The Four Freedoms Turn 70: Address to the American Society of International Law, Mar. 
24, 2011, available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/rm/2011/159195.htm, emphasizing the “time to 
move forward” for the U.S. to embrace economic, social, and cultural as well as civil and political 
rights. 
 9 See Michelman, supra note 5; Frank I. Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare 
Rights: One View of Rawls’ Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962 (1973); see also JOHN 
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999). 
 10 Michelman, supra note 5, at 33. 
 11 Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic Guaran-
tees?, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 23 (2005). 
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seven years in prison.12  Steve Biko’s Black Consciousness Movement 
was gaining ground, and that year, the ANC opened its membership to 
non-Africans.  The Freedom Charter of the ANC and its allies, now 
underground, had circulated its demands for freedom since 1955: 
alongside rights to vote, to association, to trade, and to equal status 
stood a right to education which would be “free, compulsory, universal 
and equal for all children”; a right to “be decently housed,” that “no-
one shall go hungry,” “[a] preventive health scheme shall be run by the 
state,” “[f]ree medical care and hospitalisation shall be provided for all, 
with special care for mothers and young children,” and that there 
would be a “national minimum wage” and “unemployment benefits.”13  
The creation and ratification of the Freedom Charter were treated as 
grounds for high treason. 
Three long decades later, much had changed.  By 1996, after an in-
terim first run, and a court certification, justiciable economic and so-
cial rights would become part of the new Constitution.  The rights to 
access food, health care, housing, water, social security, and educa-
tion14 would be entrenched alongside the rights to property,15 to equal-
ity,16 and the traditional civil and political rights of voting, association, 
and expression.17  The economic and social rights are now, in the 
main, to be “progressive[ly] realis[ed]” through “reasonable legislative 
and other measures, within . . . available resources.”18  Criteria for 
meaning, and a justiciable standard, now demand attention. 
Frank’s seminal work on constitutional economic and social rights 
is a sufficient coincidence between him and the new South Africa.  But 
there are many others.  His work on constitutional property, equality, 
law and economics, and state action are all examples.  His early col-
laboration on law and economics warned that the widespread assump-
tions about the efficiency of contract and property were just that: as-
sumptions that were contingent on background laws of civil, political, 
economic, and social forms of protection.19  Such work can be seen as 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 12 See generally NELSON MANDELA, LONG WALK TO FREEDOM (1994). 
 13 AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS, The Freedom Charter (1955), available at 
http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=72; see also MANDELA, supra note 12, at 170–76, 225 (de-
scribing the history and text of the Freedom Charter, and the treason charges that were directed 
against it).  
 14 S. AFR. CONST., 1996, §§ 26 (housing), 27 (health care, food, water, and social security), 29 
(education). 
 15 Id. § 25. 
 16 Id. § 9. 
 17 Id. §§ 16 (freedom of expression), 17–18 (assembly and association), 19 (campaign and vote). 
 18 Id. §§ 26(2), 27(2).  Cf. id. § 28(1)(c) (setting out the rights of children to basic nutrition, shel-
ter, basic health care services and social services, without qualification by a standard of progres-
sive realization, although subject to the limitations clause, id. § 36). 
 19 Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 711, 712–14 (1980). 
  
240 HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM [Vol. 125:236 
a prescient rejoinder to the so-called Washington Consensus and its 
blueprint for a constitutional political economy of market rights and 
economic growth,20 as well as to the influential calls to end the prob-
lem of poverty by enhancing property rights.21  When South Africa re-
placed its early Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP),22 
(a program which would, inter alia, address the basic needs of the for-
ty percent of the population living in absolute poverty) with the pro-
gram for Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR), a reading 
of Frank Michelman might have disturbed the faith in privatization, 
liberalization, and competition as a reliable formula for sustained 
growth or poverty reduction.23 
Similarly, Frank’s work drew attention to state action as ever-
present, active, and hence always open to inspection.  We might see 
this as a legally sophisticated form of the argument that poverty is not 
the result of individual idleness or misfortune, but is structural.  The 
structures of both public and private law are traceable to the state: in 
the very laws that are supposed to command legitimacy and respect.  
These laws affect private relations, bargaining power, and the distribu-
tion of (sometimes severe) economic risk.  The South African doctrine 
of “horizontal effect” (also in operation in Germany and elsewhere), 
which requires the Constitution to regulate individual-to-individual le-
gal relations, in addition to government-to-individual ones, would have 
a wise observer in Frank: of the paths through which the Constitu-
tion’s rights radiate to the common-law private law; and of how all the 
branches of the state — including its judges — are bound to attend to 
its requirements.24  Of course, Frank was not sanguine about any con-
stitution’s horizontal effect.  But more about America later. 
Finally, here was a scholar who’d spent decades resolving the so-
called “paradoxes” between constitutionalism and democracy, of the 
rule of law and the self-rule of people, and of the necessary distance 
between the self and the government in the desire for self-
government.25  For a country establishing a new majoritarian democ-
racy with a series of bold new fundamental rights, to be overseen by a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 20 See generally, JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002). 
 21 See, e.g., HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL (2000) (prescribing formali-
zation of property rights through land titling). 
 22 The African National Congress (ANC), Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU), and South African Communist Party (SACP) together released the RDP before the 
1994 elections. 
 23 For a different critique, see also Frank I. Michelman, W(h)ither the Constitution?, 21 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1063 (2000). 
 24 S. AFR. CONST., 1996, §§ 7(2), 8(1), 8(2), 8(3), 39(2). 
 25 See FRANK I. MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY (1999); Frank I. Michelman, 
The Supreme Court, 1985 Term — Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 
(1986). 
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brave new Constitutional Court, Frank’s thinking was entirely appo-
site.  When is law not politics?  Who guards the guardians?  How is 
the judicial usurpation of legislative power prevented?  How is the ju-
dicial abdication of judicial power avoided?  Frank took these slogans 
and peeled them apart, testing them in theory and in practice.  And 
key to this achievement, I suggest, is the way he did so without reach-
ing for the easy answer.  That is, he refused to give up on a conception 
of the state that could possibly lead to the slogans’ most dangerous 
applications: a state protective of negative, but crucially also positive, 
liberty. 
What did this happy coinciding of expertise and opportunity mean 
for the comparative constitutional law field?  Frank brought to it a 
more cautious, more deliberative approach.  He took comparative case 
law seriously: the new South African Constitutional Court’s judgments 
were treated, not as doctrinal formula, nor, conversely, as politics by 
other means.  They were the edifices (in-the-making) of a “respect-
worthy governmental system.”26  They were worthy of careful study 
and criticism. 
His pioneering comparative constitutional law courses involved the 
careful reading of cases, dissents, and orders, thematically and some-
times non-chronologically.  The readings included local (often critical) 
and foreign (often effusive) commentary: the contrast itself could be 
enlightening.  His seminar on U.S. and South African constitutional 
law was regularly co-taught with an eminent South African judge.  He 
expanded this method to more general comparison, exploring the Ger-
man, Canadian, Indian, and other constitutional universes, always 
carefully and never as a recitation or compilation of world trends.  His 
courses were thought-heavy, not data-heavy: no small order in this 
field. 
In the two decades after 1989, the field of comparative constitu-
tional law could have gone purely in the direction of constitution-
making, post-conflict transitions, comparative politics, or alternative 
governance structures.  The lid had blown off so many dictatorships, 
communist, and/or badly decolonized states.  What was able to reset-
tle, in the short term, in each of those scenarios, is of enormous intel-
lectual and humanist interest.  But Frank Michelman understood the 
potential for comparative law to answer other questions as well.  The-
se are the questions of his scholarly career: of the institutions, require-
ments, and workings of modern, liberal, constitutional democracy.  
This brings me to my third hypothesis: fate. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 26 For this formulation, see Frank I. Michelman, Ida’s Way: Constructing the Respect-Worthy 
Governmental System, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 345 (2003). 
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HYPOTHESIS 3: FATE 
By fate, I mean to suggest a kind of destiny: something predeter-
mined that brought Frank to South Africa.  As I see it, Frank’s consti-
tutional scholarship, despite its Americanisms and before his compara-
tive turn, was never confined to its national boundaries.  Hence, South 
Africa’s gain is also America’s; just as it is all of ours.  This, I suggest, 
stems from Frank’s consistent approach to scholarship.  “I am more 
interested in ways of thinking about certain legal problems, and in 
ways of saying what the significant factors are, than I am in doctrinal-
ly formulated summaries or predictions of outcomes,” he reported, in 
that same seminal Foreword from 1969.27 
It is fate that explains Frank’s ability to fuse philosophy and prac-
tice with such simplicity; his talent for understanding the work of ex-
traordinary judges, from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., to the new 
bench of the South African Constitutional Court, and countless others; 
his capacity for deep thought, humanity, generosity, and modesty.  His 
attention has been on the deep problems: the ones that may be easy for 
the moralist but difficult for the jurist28 — and sometimes vice versa. 
Thus, in South Africa, he was not merely content to let his seminal 
ideas fall and rest.  He actively engaged, learning and modifying his 
views in the process.  Soobramoney,29 that “wrenching” first health 
rights case heard by the Constitutional Court, was commended (for its 
outcome), criticized (for “some loose language”) and examined against 
its use of reason, and reasonableness, that would later become the crux 
of a justiciable standard in economic and social rights cases.30  Wheth-
er reasonableness can perform the work expected of it remains to be 
seen.  First, we know that disagreement can be reasonable.  Is reason-
ableness review a recipe, then, for judicial disagreements and multiply-
ing dissents?  Will such discord disturb the legitimacy of adjudication?  
Second, in our globalizing communities, with growing intra- and inter-
country disparities of wealth, with different cultural norms of social 
cooperation, with bureaucratic rationalities, economic orthodoxies, and 
veiled patriarchies feigning roots in reason, and with growing (and yet 
compartmentalized) transnational professional dialogues, to which sites 
are decision makers and judges reliably to look?31 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 27 Michelman, supra note 5, at 10. 
 28 The apology inherent in this phrase may rankle with South Africans, as with others, stem-
ming as it does from the comments of Chief Justice Marshall in decisions affirming slavery stat-
utes.  DAVID ROBARGE, A CHIEF JUSTICE’S PROGRESS 276 (2000). 
 29 Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, Kwazulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). 
 30 Frank Michelman, The Constitution, Social Rights and Reason: A Tribute to Etienne 
Mureinik, 14 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 499, 499, 502, 505–06 (1998).    
 31 Cf. JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 129–80 (1999) (extending the idea of public  
reason). 
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Kyalami Ridge,32 involving a complaint by property holders 
against the “unauthorized” relocation of destitute flood victims to 
neighboring public land, represented the Court’s use of “conventional 
judicial review.”33  With this understated case, Frank delivered vital 
proof (to those in need of it) that economic and social rights could pro-
ceed with traditional remedies, involving dismissal of a case or other 
prohibitory remedy.  Yet it is worth noting that such “negative” claims 
may often involve claimants already favored by other laws,34 and are 
the easy tip of the very difficult iceberg in economic and social rights 
cases.  I contend that proof of more case experiments, more creative 
remedies, and more linkages between courts and other branches, is 
perhaps even more critical.35 
In Carmichele,36 the plaintiff claimed a duty of the police to protect 
her against a known perpetrator, bailed, violent, and at-large.  This 
factual parallel to those of the terrible U.S. DeShaney case37 had a 
very different outcome: the Court called for an examination of com-
mon law rules of police immunity against the new requirements of the 
(interim Constitution’s) Bill of Rights.38  For Frank, Carmichele occa-
sioned a thoughtful examination of the implications, both negative and 
positive, of a “horizontal” Constitution.39  And he turned DeShaney 
upside down.  Indeed, as he succinctly cautioned, for someone interest-
ed in human rights, one’s common law may be “fine” and one’s Bill of 
Rights may be “deadly.”40  Other examples abound.  South Africans re-
sponded to the dialogue, writing responses and challenges of their own, 
including a festschrift in his honor.41 
In America, Frank’s comparative knowledge has been brought into 
his long-standing practice of subjecting Supreme Court cases to exam-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 32 Minister of Pub. Works v. Kyalami Ridge Envtl. Ass’n 2001 (3) SA 1151 (CC). 
 33 Frank I. Michelman, The Constitution, Social Rights, and Liberal Political Justification, 1 
INT’L J. CONST. L. 13, 17–19 (2003). 
 34 For such a thesis, see András Sajó, Social Rights as Middle-Class Entitlements in Hungary: 
The Role of the Constitutional Court, in COURTS AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN NEW 
DEMOCRACIES 83 (Roberto Gargarella, Pilar Domingo & Theunis Roux. eds., 2006). 
 35 See generally KATHARINE G. YOUNG, CONSTITUTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
RIGHTS (forthcoming 2012). 
 36 Carmichele v. Minister for Safety & Sec. 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC). 
 37 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
 38 Carmichele, 2001 (4) SA at 953–71.  The Court’s analysis included the Interim Constitu-
tion’s protection of equality, life, dignity, privacy, and freedom and security of the person. Id. at 
957. 
 39 See Frank I. Michelman, The Bill of Rights, the Common Law, and the Freedom-Friendly 
State, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 401 (2003). 
 40 Id. at 426; see also Frank I. Michelman, The Protective Function of the State in the United 
States and Europe: The Constitutional Question, in EUROPEAN AND U.S. 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 156 (Georg Nolte ed., 2005). 
 41 E.g., RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN A TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTION (Henk Botha, 
André van der Walt & Johan van der Walt eds., 2003). 
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ination and critique.  Pretoria City Council v. Walker,42 that infamous 
(perhaps inevitable) challenge by a white South African homeowner 
against his different, and higher, electricity charges, spurred a critical 
reflection on the implications of racial classifications and affirmative 
action in a reverse minority scenario.  What South African judges felt 
free to do and say about their country’s objective constitutional values 
revealed the “tenacious streak of self-reliant individualism” that be-
longs, conversely, within the American constitutional project.43 
In this reflective mode, comparison could fuel alternative imagin-
ings, or else fertile warnings.  When one scholar declared, in 1997, that 
Frank’s 1969 defense of economic and social rights “simply doesn’t 
live in this world anymore,”44 others could point to where, in the 
world, it did.  Doggedly proposing economic and social rights as part 
of the future liberal agenda of American constitutionalism, Frank not-
ed that certain institutional conundrums had been resolved, using the 
South African example.45  And he appealed to the transnational judi-
cial dialogue as a critical step in getting America there.46  Neverthe-
less, perhaps in more somber moments, he conceded the problematic 
dependency on judicial review, that chosen contingency that, combined 
with certain court-converted cultural commitments, provided “moral 
cover” for omitting economic and social rights from American constitu-
tional law,47 and perhaps for avoiding–in the present context, at least–
other South African developments. 
And what of the world?  It would be a mistake to see Frank’s des-
tiny as wholly within this fruitful American/South African dialectic.  
His scholarship has been translated into Chinese, Czech, French, Ger-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 42 1998 (2) SA 363 (CC). 
 43 Frank I. Michelman, Reflection, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1737, 1761 (2004); see also Frank I. 
Michelman, Reasonable Umbrage: Race and Constitutional Antidiscrimination Law in the United 
States and South Africa, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1378 (2004). 
 44 Fidelity as Translation: Colloquy, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1507, 1509 (1997) (remarks by Pro-
fessor Lawrence Lessig).  Noting the article’s considerable influence in the 1960s, Lessig went on 
to state:  
It is an odd piece — beautiful, and wonderful and we can dream about it.  But still it is 
a piece that none of us would write anymore.  That’s a reflection of something about 
how our background has changed, about what these changes can bring up, and what 
they can suppress, to note that what was great then could not be imagined now. 
Id. at 1510. 
 45 See Frank Michelman, Economic Power and the Constitution, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 
2020, at 45, 47, 52–53 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009).  For the call for this chapter to 
be written, see William E. Forbath, Not So Simple Justice: Frank Michelman on Social Rights, 
1969–Present, 39 TULSA L. REV. 597, 597–99 (2004). 
 46 See Michelman, supra note 45, at 51–52; see also S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 39(1); see general-
ly Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005). 
 47 Frank I. Michelman, Socioeconomic Rights in Constitutional Law: Explaining America 
Away, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 663, 686 (2008). 
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man, Italian and Portuguese.  His students are from all corners of the 
globe.  As commentators in “old” constitutions are redirecting attention 
away from overloaded, hardened, strong, even “deadly” courts, and 
exploring legislative or private forums of principle,48 Frank has ex-
plored what a “best efforts” obligation on all the branches of the state 
might look like.  Ironically, it is commentators in “new” constitutions, 
often dealing with greater numbers of poor, and lesser overall re-
sources, who are finding that courts may be a relatively more effective 
institution for protecting economic and social and other democratic 
rights,49 (just as, for different reasons, foreign resources are being 
poured into their judicial systems). 
CONCLUSION 
Is Frank truly a comparativist, or is he really (just?) a serendipitous 
constitutional theorist?  To answer this question, we must ask a prior 
one: what is constitutional comparison for?  The answers in the field, 
predictably, differ.  It is to universalize, to particularize, to make sys-
tems fairer, more functional, more efficient, more influential, more 
harmonized, more integrated, more global.  Alternatively, the compari-
son is to help judges do any, or all, of the above.  So, is it enough to 
place one’s normative premises against new institutional relief?  For 
Frank, it is more than enough, and I suggest that this is because of the 
way that law runs through his normative inquiry.  Law, and its de-
mands for compliance by all, will always require a justification for 
that compliance, wherever one finds oneself. 
Of course, if one looks sideways, accident, coincidence and fate all 
look pretty similar.  World events do occur according to certain non-
volitional or self-interested grooves.  But sometimes ideas serve to 
switch that groove in one way or another.50  I contend that Frank 
Michelman’s incredible body of work has been such a switch. 
 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 48 See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS (2008); Robert Post & Reva 
Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 
1027 (2004). 
 49 See, e.g., EXPLORING SOCIAL RIGHTS (Daphne Barak-Erez & Aeyal M. Gross eds., 2007); 
COURTING SOCIAL JUSTICE (Varun Gauri & Daniel M. Brinks eds., 2008); COURTS AND 
SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN NEW DEMOCRACIES (Roberto Gargarella, Pilar Domingo & 
Theunis Roux. eds., 2006). 
 50 The metaphor of the switchman belongs, of course, to Weber.  FROM MAX WEBER: 
ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 280 (H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills eds. and trans., 1946). 
